PART. I : PHILOSOPHICAL REQUISITES. SECTION. III

As an instance of the advantage which a philosophical traveller has overrnan unprepared one, look at the difference which will enter into a man'srnjudgment of nations, according as he carries about with him the vaguernpopular notion of a Moral Sense, or has investigated the laws underrnwhich feelings of right and wrong grow up in all men. It is worth whilernto dwell a little on this important point.rnrnMost persons who take no great pains to think for themselves, have arnnotion that every human being has feelings, or a conscience, born withrnhim, by which he knows, if he will only attend to it, exactly what isrnright and wrong; and that, as right and wrong are fixed and immutable,rnall ought to agree as to what is sin and virtue in every case. Now,rnmankind are, and always have been, so far from agreeing as to right andrnwrong, that it is necessary to account in some manner for the widerndifferences in various ages, and among various nations. A greatrndiversity of doctrines has been put forth for the purpose of lesseningrnthe difficulty; but they all leave certain portions of the race underrnthe condemnation or compassion of the rest for their error, blindness,rnor sin. Moreover, no doctrines yet invented have accounted for somerntotal revolutions in the ideas of right and wrong, which have occurredrnin the course of ages. A person who takes for granted that there is anrnuniversal Moral Sense among men, as unchanging as he who bestowed it,rncannot reasonably explain how it was that those men were once esteemedrnthe most virtuous who killed the most enemies in battle, while now it isrnconsidered far more noble to save life than to destroy it. They cannotrnbut wonder how it was that it was once thought a great shame to live inrnmisery, and an honour to commit suicide; while now the wisest and bestrnmen think exactly the reverse. And, with regard to the present age, itrnmust puzzle men who suppose that all ought to think alike on moralrnsubjects, that there are parts of the world where mothers believe it arnduty to drown their children, and that eastern potentates openly deridernthe king of England for having only one wife instead of one hundred.rnThere is no avoiding illiberality, under this belief,--as thernphilosopher understands illiberality. There is no avoiding thernconclusion that the people who practice infanticide and polygamy arerndesperately wicked; and that minor differences of conduct are, abroad asrnat home, so many sins.rnrnThe observer who sets out with a more philosophical belief, not onlyrnescapes the affliction of seeing sin wherever he sees difference, andrnavoids the suffering of contempt and alienation from his species, but,rnby being prepared for what he witnesses, and aware of the causes, isrnfree from the agitation of being shocked and alarmed, preserves hisrncalmness, his hope, his sympathy; and is thus far better fitted tornperceive, understand, and report upon the morals and manners of thernpeople he visits. His more philosophical belief, derived from all fairrnevidence and just reflexion, is, that every man's feelings of right andrnwrong, instead of being born with him, grow up in him from therninfluences to which he is subjected. We see that in other cases,--withrnregard to science, to art, and to the appearances of nature,--feelingsrngrow out of knowledge and experience; and there is every evidence thatrnit is so with regard to morals. The feelings begin very early; and thisrnis the reason why they are supposed to be born with men; but they arernfew and imperfect in childhood, and, in the case of those who arernstrongly exercised in morals, they go on enlarging and strengthening andrnrefining through life. See the effect upon the traveller's observationsrnof his holding this belief about conscience! Knowing that somerninfluences act upon the minds of all people in all countries, he looksrneverywhere for certain feelings of right and wrong which are as sure tornbe in all men's minds as if they were born with them. For instance, torntorment another without any reason, real or imaginary, is consideredrnwrong all over the world. In the same manner, to make others happy isrnuniversally considered right. At the same time, the traveller isrnprepared to find an infinite variety of differences in smaller matters,rnand is relieved from the necessity of pronouncing each to be a vice inrnone party or another. His own moral education having been a morernelevated and advanced one than that of some of the people herncontemplates, he cannot but feel sorrow and disgust at various thingsrnthat he witnesses; but it is ignorance and barbarism that he mourns, andrnnot vice. When he sees the Arab or American Indian offer daughter orrnwife to the stranger, as a part of the hospitality which is, in thernhost's mind, the first of duties, the observer regards the fact as hernregards the mode of education in old Sparta, where physical hardihoodrnand moral slavery constituted a man most honourable. If he sees anrnAmerican student spend the whole of his small fortune, on leavingrncollege, in travelling in Europe, he will not blame him as he wouldrnblame a young Englishman for doing the same thing. The Englishman wouldrnbe a spendthrift; the American is wise: and the reason is, that theirrncircumstances, prospects, and therefore their views of duty, arerndifferent. The American, being sure of obtaining an independentrnmaintenance, may make the enlargement of his mind, and the cultivationrnof his tastes by travel, his first object; while the conscientiousrnEnglishman must fulfil the hard conditions of independence before he canrntravel. Capital is to him one of the chief requisites of honestrnindependence; while to the American it is in the outset no requisite atrnall. To go without clothing was, till lately, perfectly innocent in thernSouth Sea Islands; but now that civilization has been fairly establishedrnby the missionaries, it has become a sin. To let an enemy escape withrnhis life is a disgrace in some countries of the world; while in othersrnit is held more honourable to forgive than to punish him. Instances ofrnsuch varieties and oppositions of conscience might be multiplied tillrnthey filled a volume, to the perplexity and grief of thernunphilosophical, and the serene instruction of the philosophicalrnobserver.rnrnThe general influences under which universal ideas and feelings of rightrnand wrong are formed, are dispensed by the Providence under which allrnare educated. That man should be happy is so evidently the intention ofrnhis Creator, the contrivances to that end are so multitudinous and sornstriking, that the perception of the aim may be called universal.rnWhatever tends to make men happy, becomes a fulfilment of the will ofrnGod. Whatever tends to make them miserable, becomes opposition to hisrnwill. There are, and must be, a host of obstacles to the expressrnrecognition of, and practical obedience to, these great principles; butrnthey may be discovered as the root of religion and morals in allrncountries. There are impediments from ignorance, and consequent error,rnselfishness, and passion: the most infantile men mistake the means ofrnhuman happiness, and the wisest have but a dim and fluctuatingrnperception of them: but yet all men entertain one common conviction,rnthat what makes people happy is good and right, and that what makes themrnmiserable is evil and wrong. This conviction is at the bottom ofrnpractices which seem the most inconsistent with it. When the Ashanteernoffers a human sacrifice, it is in order to secure blessings from hisrngods. When the Hindoo exposes his sick parent in the Ganges, he thinksrnhe is putting him out of pain by a charmed death. When Sand stabbedrnKotzebue, he believed he was punishing and getting rid of an enemy andrnan obstacle to the welfare of his nation. When the Georgian planterrnbuys and sells slaves, he goes on the supposition that he is preservingrnthe order and due subordination of society. All these notions are shownrnby philosophy to be narrow, superficial, and mistaken. They have beenrnoutgrown by many, and are doubtless destined to be outgrown by all; but,rnacted upon by the ignorant and deluded, they are very different from thernwickedness which is perpetrated against better knowledge. But thesernthings would be wickedness, perpetrated against better knowledge, if thernsupposition of a universal, infallible Moral Sense were true. Therntraveller who should consistently adhere to the notion of a Moral Sense,rnmust pronounce the Ashantee worshipper as guilty as Greenacre: thernHindoo son a parricide, not only in fact, but in the most revoltingrnsense of the term: Sand, a Thurtell: and the Georgian planter such arnmonster of tyranny as a Sussex farmer would be if he set up arnwhipping-post for his labourers, and sold their little ones to gipsies.rnSuch judgments would be cruelly illiberal. The traveller who isrnfurnished with the more accurate philosophy of Conscience would arrivernat conclusions, not only more correct, but far less painful; and,rnwithout any laxity of principle, far more charitable.rnrnSo much for one instance of the advantage to the traveller of beingrnprovided with definite principles, to be used as a rallying point andrntest of his observations, instead of mere vague moral notions andrngeneral prepossessions, which can serve only as a false medium, by whichrnmuch that he sees must necessarily be perverted or obscured.