HOW AN IDEA ENTERS THE MIND

When an impression is made on a sense organ, the sensation derived fromrnit is telegraphed up the connecting nerve fibre to the brain, and thererntranslated, by a process of which we know nothing, from a sensation torna thought.rnrnWe believe that the mind learns by experience to associate certainrnkinds of sensation with certain objects or conditions in thernenvironment, and when it feels these particular sensations, deducesrnthat certain objects are present, and forms mental images, or thoughtrnmodels, intended to represent these objects.rnrnThe truth of our percepts is determined by the closeness with whichrnour thought model corresponds to its original. An exact copy is a truernconcept, an imperfect copy an inaccurate concept.rnrnWe “recognise” an object by a process of classification, notingrnits likeness or unlikeness to other objects already known. Whenrnan unfamiliar object attracts our attention, we put it through arnprocess of comparison until we find to which compartment in ourrnconcept-pictures it should be assigned, and if we cannot find a perfectrnmatch, we put it in the most suitable compartment we can discover,rnand then partition off a little subclass for it, thus admitting itsrnidentity in essentials, but its difference in details from the otherrnoccupants of that compartment.rnrnFor example, supposing we were to land on an island and an object onrnthe shore attracted our attention, we should try to see what class ofrnthings of which we already had experience it most closely resembled.rnWe should observe its movements, and assign it to the class of livingrncreatures; see its four limbs and hair, and conclude it was an animal.rnNote its upright attitude, clothes, and weapons, and recognise these asrncharacteristic of humanity; but perceiving that its skin differed inrncolour from that of any human being we had ever seen before, we shouldrnpartition off a fresh subdivision in the department of our mind inrnwhich our ideas connected with humanity were stored, place it there,rnand probably give it a distinguishing name by means of which we couldrnindicate it to other human beings.rnrnSupposing, however, we presently come across another object of the samernnature, we should not have to make a fresh subdivision for it, butrnwould classify it with the previously examined specimen, and thus wernshould feel this time that we “knew what it was.” In fact, the processrnof “knowing” is a process of classification, and we feel that we “know”rna thing when we have assigned it to a satisfactory pigeon-hole amongrnour concepts.