CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it bernnot entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, takenrncollectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly fromrnan inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; forrnmen change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, andrnthis hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: whereinrnthey are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they haverngone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and commonrnnecessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who havernsubmitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardshipsrnwhich he must put upon his new acquisition.rnrnIn this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured inrnseizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friendsrnwho put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in thernway they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,rnfeeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armedrnforces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwillrnof the natives.rnrnFor these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupiedrnMilan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time itrnonly needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened therngates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of futurernbenefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It isrnvery true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,rnthey are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, withrnlittle reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish therndelinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself inrnthe weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first timernit was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on thernborders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary tornbring the whole world against him, and that his armies should berndefeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes abovernmentioned.rnrn [1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, whorn married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, andrn died in 1510.rnrnNevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the secondrntime. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remainsrnto name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, andrnwhat any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himselfrnmore securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.rnrnNow I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to anrnancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same countryrnand language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to holdrnthem, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;rnand to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family ofrnthe prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving inrnother things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, willrnlive quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,rnand Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,rnalthough there may be some difference in language, nevertheless therncustoms are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongstrnthemselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, hasrnonly to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family ofrntheir former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their lawsrnnor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they willrnbecome entirely one body with the old principality.rnrnBut when states are acquired in a country differing in language,rncustoms, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and greatrnenergy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most realrnhelps would be that he who has acquired them should go and residernthere. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it hasrnmade that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the otherrnmeasures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settledrnthere, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on thernspot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedyrnthem; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they arerngreat, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, therncountry is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfiedrnby prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they havernmore cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. Hernwho would attack that state from the outside must have the utmostrncaution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrestedrnfrom him with the greatest difficulty.rnrnThe other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,rnwhich may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to dornthis or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. Arnprince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expensernhe can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minorityrnonly of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give themrnto the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor andrnscattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest beingrnuninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious notrnto err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who havernbeen despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are notrncostly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, asrnhas been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, onernhas to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,rnbecause they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more seriousrnones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a manrnought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.rnrnBut in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends muchrnmore, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,rnso that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more arernexasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shiftingrnof the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, andrnall become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on theirrnown ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, suchrnguards are as useless as a colony is useful.rnrnAgain, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respectsrnought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerfulrnneighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking carernthat no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get arnfooting there; for it will always happen that such a one will bernintroduced by those who are discontented, either through excess ofrnambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans werernbrought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country wherernthey obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. Andrnthe usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreignerrnenters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by thernhatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect tornthose subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them overrnto himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which hernhas acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get holdrnof too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,rnand with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful ofrnthem, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who doesrnnot properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,rnand whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties andrntroubles.rnrnThe Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely thesernmeasures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]rnthe minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down therngreater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.rnGreece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans andrnÆtolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia wasrnhumbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans andrnÆtolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, norrndid the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friendsrnwithout first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus makernthem agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Becausernthe Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,rnwho have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, forrnwhich they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, itrnis easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, thernmedicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;rnfor it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hecticrnfever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure butrndifficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been eitherrndetected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect butrndifficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when thernevils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wisernman to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through notrnhaving been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way thatrnevery one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, thernRomans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even tornavoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that warrnis not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage ofrnothers; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus inrnGreece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoidedrnboth, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them whichrnis forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy thernbenefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour andrnprudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bringrnwith it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.rnrn [2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”rnrnBut let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of thernthings mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] asrnthe one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having heldrnpossession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that hernhas done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retainrna state composed of divers elements.rnrn [3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, died 1515.rnrn [4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.rnrnKing Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, whorndesired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. Irnwill not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get arnfoothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that everyrndoor was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced tornaccept those friendships which he could get, and he would havernsucceeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had notrnmade some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,rnregained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;rnthe Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke ofrnFerrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, ofrnPesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,rnthe Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Thenrncould the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,rnwhich, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had madernthe king master of two-thirds of Italy.rnrnLet any one now consider with what little difficulty the king couldrnhave maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules abovernlaid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for althoughrnthey were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of thernChurch, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have beenrnforced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily havernmade himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was nornsooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander tornoccupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he wasrnweakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who hadrnthrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church byrnadding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greaterrnauthority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged tornfollow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition ofrnAlexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he wasrnhimself forced to come into Italy.rnrnAnd as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, andrndeprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,rndivided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiterrnin Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that countryrnand the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; andrnwhereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, herndrove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, outrnin turn.rnrnThe wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men alwaysrndo so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; butrnwhen they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there isrnfolly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples withrnher own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then shernought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made withrnthe Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it sherngot a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it hadrnnot the excuse of that necessity.rnrnTherefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,rnhe increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, hernbrought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he didrnnot send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough torninjure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions fromrnthe Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor broughtrnSpain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary tornhumble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to havernconsented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always havernkept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians wouldrnnever have consented except to become masters themselves there; alsornbecause the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in orderrnto give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would notrnhave had the courage.rnrnAnd if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexanderrnand the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons givenrnabove that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,rnbecause it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to yourrndisadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the kingrnhad given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, inrnexchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap tornRouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning thernfaith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.rnrn [5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, andrn married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order torn retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.rnrn [6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created arn cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.rnrnThus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of thernconditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries andrnwished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much thatrnis reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantesrnwith Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of PopernAlexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on CardinalrnRouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, Irnreplied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaningrnthat otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach suchrngreatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of thernChurch and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruinrnmay be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn whichrnnever or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becomingrnpowerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought aboutrneither by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by himrnwho has been raised to power.